The Domestic Scene
The limited economic changes introduced by Gen. Raúl Castro in Cuba encouraged some observers to proclaim the end of communism and the dismantling of the totalitarian system in the island.
Notwithstanding Raúl Castro’s own statements that he was not elected to restore capitalism, these observers insisted on their belief that economic reforms will be deepened and Cuba will march merrily into capitalism or at least a Chinese-style capitalism.
If the objectives of the Castro government were truly to move toward a market economy, it would not limit economic enterprises to some 200 individual activities, i.e. barbershops, shoe shinning, pizza parlors; to lease vacant lands to individual farmers to produce mostly subsistence agriculture; or to liberalize the real estate and auto markets. In addition, the onerous taxes, regulations, and license fees imposed on these activities are not conducive toward the development of prosperous and free enterprises.
It is very difficult for Gen. Raúl Castro to reject his brother’s legacy of political and economic centralization. Raúl’s legitimacy is based on being Fidel’s heir. Any major move to reject Fidel’s “teachings” would create uncertainty among Cuba’s ruling elites – party and military. It could also increase instability as some would advocate rapid change, while others cling to more orthodox policies. Cubans could see this as an opportunity for mobilization, demanding faster reforms.
For Raúl, the uncertainties of uncorking the “genie’s reform bottle” in Cuba are greater than keeping the lid on and moving cautiously. For the past five decades, political considerations have always dictated the economic decisions of the communist leadership in the island.
At 86 years of age, General Castro wants to muddle through these difficult times introducing limited changes and maintaining tight political control. His aim is to calm down a growing unhappy population and to prevent a social explosion, not to transform Cuba into a capitalist society. By his actions and statements, Raúl Castro is signaling that Cuba will remain a failed totalitarian experiment for the foreseeable future.
His relinquishing the Presidency to a minor communist Party bureaucrat in early 2018, while remaining as Secretary General of the Party and de facto leader of the military is a clear indication of a limited succession and not a transition process. The new President has no military or popular support and will be beholding to the wishes of Raul and his close military allies in the Party’s Politburo. The creation of a military “troika” to rule over the three regions of Cuba is a further example of a militarized succession in the island.
The Foreign Dimension
Raúl does not seem ready to provide meaningful and irreversible concessions for a long-term U.S.-Cuba normalization. Like his brother in the past, public statements and speeches are politically motivated and directed at audiences in Cuba, the U.S. and Europe. Avenues for serious negotiations have never been closed as evidenced by the diplomatic normalization under President Obama and migrations and anti-hijacking agreements between the United States and Cuba.
Raúl is unwilling to renounce the support and close collaboration of countries like Venezuela, China, Iran, North Korea and Russia in exchange for an uncertain relationship with the United States. Raúl’s policies are more likely to remain closer to regimes that are not particularly friendly to the United States and that demand little from Cuba in return for generous aid.
Yet there is the strong belief in the United States that economic considerations could influence Cuban policy decisions, and that an economically deteriorating situation could force the Castro regime to move Cuba toward a market economy and eventually toward political reforms. This has not happened and is not likely to happen.
Among many in the United States, there is still a belief that the embargo is the cause of Cuba’s economic ills. This notion has been propagated continuously by the Castro regime to force the United States to unilaterally lift U.S. sanctions.
In reality, the cause of Cuba’s economic problems is not the embargo but a failed economic system. Like the Soviet and Eastern European Marxist economies, Cuba’s system is antiquated, inefficient and corrupt. It does not encourage productivity or individual initiative. If Cuba were to export and produce more, it could buy any products it needs from other countries. For Cuba, the Unites States is the closest but not the cheapest market. What the Castro regime welcomes is
American tourists and credits to help scrape by without making major economic or political changes.
America’s long-held belief that, through negotiations and incentives, we can influence Raúl’s behavior has been weakened by his unwillingness to provide major concessions to the United States. Raúl prefers to sacrifice the economic well-being of the Cubans, rather than cave in to demands for a different Cuba, politically and economically. Neither economic incentives nor punishment have worked with Cuba in the past. They’re not likely to work in the future. In a January 1, 2019 speech he again blamed the U.S. for Cuba’s ills and remained defiant of U.S. policies.
After Raúl
If Raúl Castro were to die or become incapacitated, it will be the Politburo of Cuba’s Communist Party who will decide on a replacement. While Raúl designated Miguel Díaz Canel as Cuba’s new President, his permanency will depend on circumstances at the time. If the dissapeaperance of the last Castro aoccurs under increased social pressure or violence, it is likely that the Politburo will select a hard liner, probably from the military. Given that most of the members of the Politburo are military, this group will make the ultimate decision. Although Díaz Canel also has military rank, it is not likely that the Generals in the Politburo will turn to him at a time of crisis.
If the succession is peaceful Díaz Canel will continue and will have to contend with the power of the older generals, and Raúl’s son Alejandro Castro Espín, a colonel/coordinator of the military and security forces and an emerging force. Without support within the military or in the party, Díaz Canel remains a puppet figure with limited power and leverage.
The key question about post-Castro Cuba is not who its new rulers will be or what they would like to accomplish. The key question is whether the institutionalization of the revolution under the control of the military, the party and the security apparatus will survive the end of Raúl Castro’s rule. And equally important, what can any emerging leadership hope to accomplish within the existing socio-political and economic context.
There are also other key and more troubling questions: Will the new rulers be able to exercise any major options at all? Will they fear upsetting the multilevel balance of interests upon which a new government will certainly depend?
The impediments to major change are significant:
- A terrorized, disorganized and fearful population hoping for change from above. There is a strong belief among the Cuban people about the efficacy of the security services and an overwhelming fear of their repressive capabilities. The political elite see the development of a civil society as a major challenge to its absolute authority and a threat to its long-term control. The limited gains made by a civil society independent of the Castro brothers in the past few years, are the result of a deteriorating economy; disillusionment with the revolution and growing unhappiness with the Castro regime; influence of outside forces; and a limited relaxation of the system’s control. Yet civil society remains weak, not very effective and watched carefully and constantly by the security forces.
- The military, the most important institution in contemporary Cuba, has significant legitimacy and respect and is a disciplined and loyal force. It controls more than 60 % of the economy. Will they be willing to relinquish this economic control and their prominent role? One of Cuba’s major post-Castro challenge will be how to extricate the military from the economy and put them back in the barracks.
The possibility of regime continuity, therefore, seems stronger for Cuba than it was for other communist states. Although their end came suddenly, it took decades of decay to weaken critically the Eastern European regimes and successive leadership changes, as well as Soviet disengagement and acceptance, before the collapse.
The end of the Castro era may not usher in a period of rapid political or economic transformation or in a collapse of the system. The stability of the Cuban regime is based primarily on the strength of the Armed Forces, the security apparatus, and the Party structure. The organization and strength of the bureaucracy that has grown around these institutions seem to assure short term continuity. Barring the imponderable or unpredictable, rapid change is not likely.
Perhaps the critical challenge for a post-Raúl regime will be to improve the economy and satisfy the needs and expectations of the population, while maintaining continuous political control. Too rapid economic reforms may lead to a loosening of political control, a fact feared by the military, and other allies bent on remaining in power and continue to profit from their privileged positions. Unfortunately for the Cubans, transition may be slow and painful.
*Jaime Suchlicki is Director of the Cuban Studies Institute, CSI, a non-profit research group in Coral Gables, FL. He is the author of Cuba: From Columbus to Castro & Beyond, now in its 5th edition; Mexico: From Montezuma to the Rise of the PAN, 2nd edition, and Breve Historia de Cuba. He is a highly regarded consultant to the public and private sector.