The Spanish empire in the Americas was carefully regulated to create societies subservient to the Spanish Crown. Church establishment, the patronato real, meant that religious and political affairs were never clearly separated. In Cuba, however, lack of indigenous support restricted the Church to its primary role, to advise and assist the governor, and it did not acquire great wealth. Because the colonial population was chiefly made up of Spaniards or their descendants and slaves under their control, the island was rapidly inundated with missionaries, but this immigration had tapered off by the 17th century. Conflicts between Church and State were concerned primarily with the institution of slavery, which the Church was instrumental in undermining. It not only provided the slaves with practical and religious instruction, but also guaranteed them freed time and opportunity to work for wages and buy their freedom. A master could also free a slave by publicly acknowledging his intent while attending mass. Statistics confirm that the church was successful in its mission. The population of freed Blacks and mulattos was sizable enough as early as 1560 to elect its own constable in Havana and by 1600 to field a full company of militia. By the early 1820s the number of baptisms and marriages among slaves equaled those among Whites. In 1861 the free Blacks accounted for nearly 40% of the entire Afro-Cuban community. Nevertheless, the clergy never managed to cleave the African from his traditions. His truancy in religious activities was often because of participation in one of the various cabildos.
Foreign visitors were struck by a lack of religious observance among all classes, the English novelist Anthony Trollope opining in 1860 that Roman Catholic worship was “at a lower ebb than almost any country” in which he had seen it.
Anticlerical tendencies among 19th century Spanish Liberals caused the closing of minor convents in 1820, but in Cuba state power showed itself more often in actions against manifestations of liberalism in the clergy, as in Governor Tacón’s securing the 1837 recall of archbishop Alameda, or the Captain General’s exclusion of Bishop González Estrada on his April 12, 1873, return from New York. But in general, few major differences threatened the symbiotic relationship between church and state until the rise of French-oriented rationalism, chiefly centered in the Freemasonry movement. Freemasonry became a key element in the independence movement, which the Church, as part of the established order, opposed. This opposition led to the immediate discredit of the Church after independence. The Constitution of 1901 disestablished the Church and was designed to take away its tax revenue and voice in official policies. Religious instruction in public schools was forbidden. The Church lost its state subsidies and was denied compensation for properties seized by the colonial government for its needs during the Independence War of 1895-1898. Civil marriage, required under the first United States intervention, became compulsory again from 1918. No concordat was negotiated, and the new republic did not even open diplomatic relations with the Vatican until 1935.
Despite its disestablishment and the growth of Protestantism, the Church remained the dominant religious influence in Cuba, although its political outlook changed from conservative in the1920s to reformist in the 1940s. Following the foundation of the Chrisian Social Democracy Movement in1942, efforts were made to demonstrate the relevance of the Church, particularly to the urban lower class, and to obtain a voice in the political forum. These ideas were not radical for the time and had conservative support. Although the highest officials in the Church were now mostly Cuban, it continued to depend on foreign-born clergy. These were mostly Spanish: 202 out of 308 clergy in 1907, 426 out of 582 in 1919. The Church remained aligned with the upper class and the conservative press, although its influence spread to other classes through the expansion of such lay groups as Acción Católica and related clubs and clínicas (health clinics). Anticlericalism was in abeyance by the 1940s, but the Church’s history in the 1950s was, with some important exceptions, one of passivity. Scant attention was paid to the rural lower classes, beyond the sending of a few priests, who, because of the poverty and indifference of their parishioners, were forced to accept the financial support of local sugar mill magnates, to their eventual discredit. According to historian Leslie Dewart, the Batista regime “enjoyed an unprecedented degree of episcopal benison during six and a half of its not quite seven years.” Much of this has been attributed to the largesse bestowed on the Church by Batista’s second wife, and to the nature of the hierarchy and the clergy in general. In 1955 half of the island’s priests were Cuban born. Archbishop Manuel Arteaga and other leading churchmen collaborated or believed that politics was none of the Church’s business. But as the excesses of the regime multiplied, many upper- and middle-class Cubans turned to the Church for salvation, and a Catholic opposition began to develop, among both laity and clergy. In late 1956, as their activities attracted more sympathizers, government response became more direct, but this, in turn, forced more Catholics into the underground. By the triumph of the Revolution of 1959, six priests and one Protestant minister were directly attached to the rebel army.
Relations between all denominations and the new government vacillated considerably in the next 15 years, shifting from a period of initial cordiality and acceptance to one of open confrontation, and then, in the mid-1970s into a period of cautious détente. Both sides, and a number of factors, contributed. The government curtailed many of the church’s traditional functions and persecuted both laity and clergy. Church members have encouraged counter revolutionary activities. Exile groups and traditional Roman Catholic elements attributed repression to the government’s Marxist-Leninist character and theoretical emphasis on atheism and considered the regime antireligious. Government officials accused the Church of being a repository for counter revolutionary forces linked to external agents who sought its overthrow. Other observers hypothesized that the repression stemmed from a resurgence of early 20th century anticlericalism. Most scholars have seen repression of organized religion as part of a general endeavor to remove all existing or potential organized opposition. Despite internal weaknesses and vacillation, the Church still possessed the most extensive and best organized institutional apparatus in pre-revolutionary Cuba. It was the only mass organization, and so its potential as a pressure group was considerable. According to this explanation, the Church was not persecuted because of anti-religious sentiment within the government, but because it could, and eventually did, serve as a springboard for counter revolutionary activities.
Through the early months of 1959 there was a brief honeymoon in which laity and clergy alike were generally favorable to the new government and its reforms. Various of its leaders were named to important government posts and high-ranking officials openly participated in religious activities. Opposition began to coalesce around various church institutions after the growth of Communist influence in the Castro government and Castro’s anti-US posture. The first agrarian reform law was more radical than had been expected, and many landowners who mobilized against it were supported by church organizations. An even great blow was the reforms in education, which confirmed the secular character of public schools, prohibiting any form of religious instruction in them. Churchmen were outspoken in defense of Havana’s Catholic university, the Universidad de Santo Tomás de Villanueva, and its right to exist. They urged freedom of education and expression, and also sought mercy for those Batista supporters under sentence of death. At the National Catholic Conference in November 1959 about a million people turned out to support the stance of the Church.
A period of open confrontation began in 1960 and lasted for the next four years. More Catholics, including many who had initially supported the Revolution took part in counterrevolutionary activities. In January 1960 Castro condemned such opposition, especially among the Spanish-born clergy – traditionally the most conservative element in the hierarchy. The resumption of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and dialogue with the People’s Republic of China further alienated the Catholic faithful. Roman Catholic publications began a campaign against the rise of Communism in Cuba, and this was followed by sporadic civil disorder, verbal attacks on the government in churches, and some arrests. In August 1960 Castro attacked the hierarchy directly and followed with his own anticlerical campaign in the media. During the fall of that year, lay organizations aligned themselves with the hierarchy, and Castro again criticized them. A pastoral letter signed by all the bishops denounced government attacks on the Church, citing in detail repressive measures, both against the Church in general and certain clergy specifically. Name-calling increased on both sides in early 1961. Some churches and Catholic schools were temporarily occupied by the military, and some religious services were disrupted. The involvement of prominent Catholics, including the Spanish priests, in the Bay of Pigs invasion brought further repression. In the days following, two prelates and many priests were taken into custody, many churches were temporarily closed, and the offices of several Church organizations occupied. The residence permits of foreign clergy were reviewed and some were expelled from Cuba. All private schools were nationalized. Hundreds of clergies were forced to leave Cuba or chose to do so. The number of priests and male religious in the country fell to two hundred, and that of nuns also to about two hundred. Although the Church learned to keep a low profile, some persecution continued. The year 1986 saw the resurgence of Church activity with the Encuentro Eclesial Cubano (ENEC), a national conference to review the Chruch’s position and actions via-a-vis the regime.
It was estimated in the early 21st century that 35% of Cubans were baptized Catholics and that Sunday mass was attended by some 100,000 to 200,000 communicants, but these numbers have been increasing.
