IMPLICATIONS OF THE BAY OF PIGS FIASCO

PART II

The disillusionment and frustration caused by the 1961 Bay of Pigs failure among anti-Castro forces, both inside and out of Cuba, prevented the growth of significant organized opposition.  With little hope for change more than 2 million Cubans migrated from the island mostly to the U.S.  With his power consolidated Castro could embark on massive confiscation of both foreign and domestic properties; the establishment of a Marxist society; the transformation of the educational and value systems following the Soviet model; and the creation of a highly repressive force organized by the German Communist Stasi.

The single most important event encouraging and accelerating Soviet involvement in Cuba was the Bay of Pigs fiasco.  The failure of the United States to act decisively against Castro gave the Soviets some illusions about U.S. determination and interest in the island.  The Kremlin leaders now perceived that further economic and even military involvement in Cuba would not entail any danger to the Soviet Union itself and would not seriously jeopardize U.S.-Soviet relations.  This view was further reinforced by President Kennedy’s apologetic attitude concerning the Bay of Pigs invasion and his generally weak performance during his summit meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1962.  

One of the lessons coming out of the U.S. failure in Cuba is that policy actions in one area of the world, no matter how insignificant or limited, are carefully assessed by enemies as well as friends of the U.S.  These assessments lead to policy changes that affect their actions. In some cases, encourages risky policies. The introduction of Soviet nuclear missiles into Cuba in October 1962, brought the world close to a nuclear holocaust.

The years that followed the Bay of Pigs failure ensued in questioning about who was responsible for the failure.  Why did Americans engaged in such a military operation that failed?  The wisdom and maturity of the Kennedy administration came into question.  U.S. prestige in Latin America and throughout the world sank to a low point.

One of the consequences of the Bay of Pigs failure was to bring to the national attention U.S. policy toward Cubans.  While some advocated a continuous hard line toward the Castro regime, others advocated diplomacy to deal with the Cuban leader.  To this date the debate over confrontation or engagement remains a thorny issue in U.S.-Cuban relations.  The recent Obama engagement with Cuba has once more shown the weakness of this policy.  Despite removing the Castro government from the State Department terrorist list; allowing travel by American tourists to the island; a visit by President Obama to Cuba and normalization of diplomatic relations, the Castro regime failed to moderate its foreign policy, its internal repression or its anti-American posture.  The Bay of Pigs unleashed a difficult and troublesome issue into the American scene, one that has not been resolved for over 60 years.

The U.S. failure to dislodge the Castro regime from power also forced the U.S. to deal, for the next six decades, with an antagonistic regime bent on subverting U.S. policies and institutions.  Fidel Castro and his brother have been relentless enemies of the U.S. constantly criticizing U.S. policies, spying on the U.S. government, and attacking American values and institutions.

Not only the U.S. has had to deal with Cuba, but Cubans have had to suffer 60 years of repression and poverty.  The Castro policies transformed for the worse, not only the economy of Cuba, but also the nature of the Cubans, converting them into puppets and instruments of an abusive and failed system.

*Jaime Suchlicki is Director of the Cuban Studies Institute, CSI, a non-profit research group in Coral Gables, FL. He is the author of Cuba: From Columbus to Castro & Beyond, now in its 5th edition; Mexico: From Montezuma to the Rise of the PAN, 2nd edition, and of Breve Historia de Cuba.