Negotiating with Cuba

* Jaime Suchlicki

     Despite mounting economic difficulties, the Cuban government is not likely to open up Cuba’s economy or to offer meaningful concessions to the U.S. for normalization of relations.

     The short-lived period of “normalization” between the U.S. and Cuba under President Obama was characterized by U.S. major concessions – lifting of the travel ban, removing  Cuba from the list of terrorist countries, increase in remittances, etc.  In return the Cuban government provided very few concessions – released a few political prisoners, allowed diplomatic relations, and invited President Obama to Havana.  Raul Castro pocketed the U.S. concessions and asked for more.

     Political and economic centralization and control, and ideological rigidity are General Castro’s chosen policies to guarantee a successful succession and to prevent Cuba’s transformation into a democratic, market economy. 

      Major concessions to the U.S. would mean a rejection of one of Fidel Castro’s main legacies: anti-Americanism. It may create uncertainty among the elites that govern Cuba leading to friction and factionalism. The Cuban population also could see this as an opportunity for mobilization demanding faster reforms. It could also be seen as a weakening of Cuba’s anti-American alliances with radical regimes in Latin America, Iran, and Cuba’s defection from the anti-imperialist front. 

      U.S. normalization of relations may mean a victory for Raul and the legitimization of his military regime. Yet it is a small prize when compared to the uncertainties that a Cuba-U.S. relation may produce internally and externally among Cuba’s allies. 

     From Cuba’s point of view, the U.S. has little to offer. American tourists, which Raul wants but does not need to survive; American investments, which he fears may subvert his highly centralized and controlled economy; and products that he can buy cheaper from other countries. The U.S. does not have, furthermore, the ability to provide Cuba with the petroleum Venezuela has been sending with little or no payment. Aid from Venezuela, Iran, Russia, and China, furthermore, are provided with no conditions. These regimes demand little from Cuba. 

     The periodic public statements that Raul has made about wanting negotiations with the U.S. are politically motivated and directed at audiences in the U.S. and Europe. In particular, Raul believes that the “correlation of forces” are such in the U.S. that in a post Trump era Congress may lift the travel ban and end the embargo unilaterally, without Cuba having to make any concessions. 

      The issue is not about negotiations or talking. There has to be a willingness on the part of the Cuban leadership to offer real concessions-in the area of human rights and political and economic openings as well as cooperation on anti-terrorism and drug interdiction-for the U.S. to change its policies. The U.S., as well as other countries, do not give away major policies without a substantial quid pro quo. Only when Raul is willing to deal, not only to the United States, but more importantly to the Cuban people, then and only then the U.S. should begin to change its policies. 

     Following are some of the possible concessions and demands of the Cuban government.

     I. The Cuban government would want:

1. The lifting of the travel ban for Americans to visit Cuba and an end to the embargo. 
2. Access to private credits from the U.S. as well as from international organizations. 
3. Payment for the “damage” caused by the U.S. embargo (between $40-50 billion). 
4. Access to the U.S. market to sell Cuban products. 
5. Return to Cuba of the Guantanamo naval base. 
6. Allow Cubans to migrate legally to the U.S. 
7. Permission for Cubans to travel to the U.S. as visitors. 
8. Increase in U.S. remittances to Cuba.
9. An end to Radio/TV Marti transmissions to Cuba as well as the USAID Cuba Program. 

II. In return, the Cuban government would be willing to:

1. Pay for U.S. confiscated properties ($5-6 billion) to be deducted from reparations paid by the U.S. for the embargo.
2. Release most political prisoners in Cuban jails as long as they are accepted into the U.S.
3. Allow American investments in selected sectors of the Cuban economy and in partnership with the Cuban government, offshore oil exploration, tourist hotels and resorts, etc.
4. Buy more American products, particularly if the U.S. provides credit.
5. Control the flow of illegal Cuban migration into the U.S.
6. Cooperate in drug interdiction.
7. Return several American fugitives from the U.S. legal system now living in the island.
8. Upgrade diplomatic relations and receive a U.S. Ambassador.
9. Permit U.S. diplomats in Cuba to travel outside of Havana.
10. Stop harassing U.S. diplomats in Cuba. 

III. From the Cuban government’s point of view, the following are not negotiable:

1. Cuba’s internal political and economic system.
2. The issue of human rights, since Cuba claims there are no violations of human rights in the island.
3. The government’s control of the media, internet, all publications.
4. The government’s control of the educational system.
5. The government’s control of the labor movement.
6. Cuba’s international relations; especially with Venezuela, Iran, and Russia.
7. Cuba’s support for anti-American, leftist, and terrorist organizations throughout the world.
8. The Chinese cyber-electronic facility operating in Bejucal near Havana. 
9. A possible Russian space tracking station to be built in Cuba.
10. The visits to Cuba of Russian military planes and naval ships, especially submarines. 

* Jaime Suchlicki is Director and founder of the Cuban Studies Institute. He is the author of Cuba: From Columbus to Castro, now in its fifth edition; Mexico: From Montezuma to NAFTA, now in its second edition and the recently published Breve Historia de Cuba.  He is a highly regarded consultant to the public and private sectors.